A Red Cross donation and pay prompted different forms of cooperation

In an online game with groups of five, donation was associated with full cooperation, while pay was associated with fewer people refusing to cooperate.

How we make these readings

The key idea

The donation was associated with full cooperation, while the reward was associated with less total non-participation.

The study, in plain language

In an online game, groups of five people completed image-recognition tasks. The team tested what happened when effort benefited a cause, the worker, or both.

With the Red Cross donation option, more people cooperated fully. The monetary reward, by contrast, was associated with fewer people not cooperating at all. The two incentives affected different ends of behavior. There were also fewer non-cooperators among those who said they were more willing to reciprocate, while general trust showed no relationship.

What they found

  • Where donation was possible, more people completed all the tasks.
  • With a monetary reward, fewer people stopped cooperating altogether.
  • Fewer people did not cooperate among those who said they were willing to reciprocate. General trust showed no relationship.

Something to think about

When you work with other people, what motivates you more: knowing who benefits from your effort or what you earn?

How they studied it

In Japan, groups of five participants could complete up to 100 image-recognition tasks. The experiment compared four conditions: no incentive, a Red Cross donation, a monetary reward, or both.

What the study cannot show

  • The sample came from a Japanese platform, and some participants dropped out between the start and finish. The image task is not equivalent to a job.
  • The study does not show that donations or pay always increase cooperation in a real organization or recommend a personal financial choice.

The original study

Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games

PLOS ONE, 16(4), e0249217 · DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0249217. Published .

Study authors (1)

Jakob Hackel; Hitoshi Yamamoto; Isamu Okada; Akira Goto; Alfred Taudes

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0249217

Source under CC BY 4.0. English adaptation and explanation by PaperFlow, with AI assistance. The text has been reorganized for a general audience; it is not the complete paper and does not imply endorsement by its authors.

One study alone does not represent a field's consensus. Educational content does not replace professional advice. Report a possible error.